

TRAGEDY OF JINNAH
(2nd Revised Edition.)

TRAGEDY OF JINNAH

BY

KAILASH CHANDRA

FOREWORD BY

MISS JETHI T. SIPAHIMALANI

Deputy Speaker, Sind Assembly



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Dedicated to my father
The late Pandit Moti Ram
Advocate,
President Bar Association,
Jhang.

FOREWORD

I have had a glance at Mr. Kailash's *Tragedy of Jinnah*. The book appears to me be a comprehensive history of the Communal Problem—the most difficult and most baffling, that we have to solve—and the various attempts that have been made from time to time to tackle it.

The labour that Mr. Kailash has bestowed on the book is praiseworthy and I have no doubt that the book will be of immense use to students of public affairs in our country.

The author's criticism at certain places is rather strong and I wish he had rather left it out.

KARACHI :

14th June, 1941. JETHI T. SIPAHIMALANI

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

The so-called Indian Communal problem has become a nuisance in Indian politics. It comes handy to the British Raj when awkwardly facing the demand of India's freedom. It has given birth to selfish and fanatic demagogues who have played havoc in the Indian toy-shop. It has let loose a feeling of fear, mutual hatred, disgust and fatalism. There prevails an atmosphere of suspense, suspicion and hostility in India.

It is sought to be made out that the problem is the outcome of capricious intentions of one community to sweep up the legitimate rights and interests of others. The British Raj are always at pains to show that India's communal troubles are of her own making. So long as the communal problem is not solved to the satisfaction of *all concerned*, British Raj will have no truck with Indian aspirations. They, by their "*close association with all classes*" of Indians have got an "*obligation*" towards them, which the British Raj would fail to discharge, if they allow India to be free, without making "*adequate*" arrangements for the welfare of their age-long friends ! Thus India's progress hangs in the balance !

It becomes imperative, therefore, that an attempt be made to study the problem from its historical aspect. Much of the problem would be found to be a purely

manufactured stuff, and the rest of it a myth ! Even if an insignificant fraction of it is a reality, it is the result of individual bungling and individual super-sensitiveness.

Certainly it does us no credit to allow the Indian stalemate to grow because of the so-called communal problem. It would be equally true on the other hand, that the problem is neither of our making nor entirely of our un-doing. Our communal problem is a feather in our masters' cap, and we cannot pluck it with impunity.

Our masters have thought it wise to favour one or the other community in India as the exigencies of the situation demanded. As early as 1821 a British official wrote in *The Asiatic Journal* :—

“*Divide et impera* should be the motto of our Indian administration, whether political, civil or military.”

Lt.-Col. John Coke, Commandant at Moradabad, at the time of Indian Mutiny wrote :—

“Our endeavours should be to *uphold in full force the* (for us fortunate) *separation which exists* between the different religions and races, *not to endeavour to amalgamate them. Divide et impera* should be principle of Indian Government.”

Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, in a minute dated May 14, 1859, wrote :—

“*Divide et impera* was the old Roman motto and it should be ours.”

Sir John Stratchey, an important British Indian Civilian, said :—

“The existence side by side, of hostile creeds among Indian people is *one of the strong points in our political position in India.*”

The balance of favouritism swung in favour of the Hindus first. Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India was not quite satisfied with the attitude of the Indian Muslims in days of the First Kabul Expedition, and therefore was anxious to secure the enthusiastic support of the Hindus. In a letter dated October 4, 1842, written to Duke of Wellington, he expressed a keen desire to secure the active support of the Hindus, who, he felt, were more faithful than the Muslims !

Again Lord Ellenborough wrote on 18th January, 1843 :—

“I cannot close my eyes to the belief, that the race (Muslims) is fundamentally hostile to us and, therefore, *our true policy is to reconcile the Hindus.*”

The Hindu having drunk at the spring of his masters, thought that imitation was the surest flattery, and began to demand Home Rule and other political rights, which his masters enjoyed at home. At once there was a swing to the left—towards Muslims.

Sir Bampfylde Fuller, Governor of East Bengal declared in an address that the Government of India had

two wives, Hindu and Muslim, of which the Muslim was the "favourite wife."

Lord Oliver, Secretary of State for India, very frankly admitted that the "predominant bias in British officialdom in favour of the Muslim community was partly on the ground of closer sympathy, *but more largely as a make-weight against Hindu nationalism.*"

It is said in certain quarters that race hatred and communalism are not purely of British origin, these existed before the British arrived on the scene. What does Sir John Maynard, retired Senior Member of the Executive Council of the Punjab say about it ?

"It is, of course, true that British authority could not have established, could not now maintain itself, but for a fissiparous tendency of which the Hindu-Muslim antagonism is one manifestation. It is also true that the mass rivalry of the two communities began under British rule. Persecuting rulers made their appearance from time to time in the pre-British era, levying tribute on unbelievers or punishing with fanatical zeal the slaying of kine. But the Hindu and Muslim masses before they had eaten of the tree of knowledge and become religion-conscious *worshipped peacefully side by side at the same shrines.*"

The present book is just an attempt at an historical survey of the problem and its analysis as it stands to-day. In the later portion of the book, the present leadership

of the Muslim League comes in for a good deal of criticism. I wish I could avoid it.

I hope the reader shall find the book useful. Any suggestions for improvement for the second edition shall be gratefully received.

I have liberally drawn on the works of many writers for the production of this book. My heart-felt thanks to them.

I am grateful to my friends, A. N. Sharma and Shadi Lal Malhotra for the kind help rendered by them in writing this book.

My thanks are also due to my friends Shri Jagannath Ji, Cnmrade Ram Krishan, Mr. Arjan Das, Mr. Harnam Das for their kind help, which I very much appreciate.

I have also to thank Messrs. K. R. Sondhi and F. C. Kapur of the "Allied Press" for their kind co-operation.

I thank all of them once again.

JHANG (PUNJAB) :

KAILASH CHANDRA

June 18, 1941.

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PREFACE TO THE 2ND EDITION.

Due to difficulties in procuring paper the second edition could not be placed in the market earlier.

Much water has flown down the bridges since the publication of the first edition. Catastrophic changes have taken place all over the world. Hongkong, Singapore, Barneo, Malaya, Burina and other tiny spots in the far eastern pacific have changed colours and hands. America stands stripped of its territories in the high seas around Japan. Italian Empire in Africa has become a thing of the past. The Union Jack and the American flags fly and flutter over the places which the Italians took ages to carve for themselves. The man of the proud chin is now "Poor little Mussolini." Stalin is fighting back and also grumbling about the meagreness of outside help, about which he had great illusions. Hitler repents having been taken in by "the greatest camouflage" in world history—that Russo-Finnis War. Chiang-ki-Sheik fights with his back to the wall—a grim battle indeed. The tiny possessions of the Dutch, the French and others no longer trouble and worry the boy in the History and Geography class. White man's lunden looks to have been made lighter, but in reality it has become heavier! Too heavy perhaps. World is more in the throes of confusion than ever—

Bloody confusion Prophecies about the war are wishful thinking.

India too had its share of confusion and pain. British Machiavellianism stands more ingloriously exposed. Cripps Fraud was a heart-rending blow to Gandhiji's trust in the bonafides of the British. How sore was Gandhiji about it! People like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru are painfully dismayed. Frustration has seized the minds of our leadership. We really do not know the next step. The British Raj have lost all decency and grace (if they ever had any) in dealing with the Indian problem. How gratuitous was the insult in the refusal of the Viceroy to discuss the Indian situation with the leaders of the Non-parties Conference. Can that sort of mentality be the basis for any co-operation on any plane?

The British Raj have openly stepped out to flirt with the Muslim League, and other non-Congress elements in the country. The inclusion of Dr. N. B. Khare in the Viceroy's expanded Council is a bait to many a political weakling in India. Betray the country and the Congress and atonce a big reward begins to dangle before you. Quislings are not a Norwegian phenomenon; they spring up everywhere. How paying it becomes sometimes to outrage your motherland!

The second edition goes out bearing the prints of many obsessions in the mind of the author. His helplessness, his agony and anguish, perhaps they again find a reflection in the book, as they did in the first edition.

as criticised for having chosen to express myself in
 her strong words. My criticism of the Muslim
 League was in some quarters misunderstood as from a
 Hindu Communalist. This is an exceedingly wrong
 impression. I as much hate Mahasabha Communalism
 as I hate the League Communalism. Communalism to
 me is a walking plague. A thing I dread. The Muslim
 League Press was touched to the quick for my having
 called it a gutter-press. Very indecent abuses which
 prohibit mention were hurled at me. I refused to take
 any notice of them beyond feeling that I was not sure
 they would endorse my views about them so profusely !
 The appreciation of the book by journals like the
Tribune, *The Amrit Bazar Patrika*, *The Sind Observer*,
National Herald and others were exceedingly healthy,
 helpful and encouraging. The *Modern Review* and about
 half a dozen other journals complained that I had not
 suggested any solution of the Communal problem. I
 am afraid they missed the whole import of the book. I
 had informed the reader that the book was "an attempt
 at an historical survey of the problem and its analysis
 as it stands today;" and my attempt was to prove
 that the problem was a myth—a manufactured stuff—a
 feather in our master's cap." Now with these premises
 to expect any suggestion about the solution of
 communalism is to expect too much.

If it is any consolation to my kind critics I think the
 only way to eradicate the nuisance of the communal
 problem is to expose the communalists and their

(in)

unscrupulous designs and to educate the masses that the interests of Hindus and Muslims are identical.

I renew my thanks to all those kind friends whose criticism and advise I sought and got.

JIHANG (PUNJAB).

KAILASH CHANDRA

26th May, 1943.

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
CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
1. Counterpoise to Congress Aims	1
2. Onwards ...	12
3. Tumultuous Times ..	21
4. Conferences and Riots	41
5. Simon Commission and After	49
6. Conspirators Active	62
7. Nationalist Muslims Active ...	78
8. Nationalist Muslims <i>versus</i> Com- munalists	101
9. John Bull <i>versus</i> Unity Conference ..	116
10. Revival of the League ..	123
11. The Elections of 1937	132
12. Elusive Jinnah ..	138
13. Jinnah Shuns Settlement ...	193
14. Deliverance Day ..	198
15. What Are You Fighting For. Qaid-i-Azam ?	211
16. Bull in a China Shop	232
17. A Pitiabie Dictator	243
18. Separation Since When ?	257
19. Political Ribaldry	263
20. Open Flirtation	272
21. Blighter Politics	281
22. Communal Award	285
23. Index	289

ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
	<i>Frontispiece.</i>
Tender Solitude ...	210
More War Aims ...	221
The Guillotine Wants You ...	242
Knock Out in Sind ...	261—262
Blitzkrieg ...	

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CHAPTER I

"Counterpoise" to Congress Aims

THE Indian National Congress born in 1885 had become a fairly restive child by the beginning of the twentieth century. The British Government in India had thought that the Congress would continue to remain a steam-letting organisation standing between the Government and the people, as an intermediary or, still better, as an informer to the British Government, of the winds and currents of Indian public opinion, which at that time meant the opinion of the few educated persons in the country. The Government had perhaps realised, that one of the causes of the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857 (also called India's First War of Independence by Nationalist India), was the absolute apathy of the British bureaucrat towards the Indians, their views and aspirations. And it was right. The birth of the Indian National Congress was brought about with this object. The Viceroy of India at that time was expected to preside at the inauguration of the first session of the Congress at Bombay, but due to some more important engagements he could not do so and his place was taken up by the Governor of the presidency of Bombay.

For a few next years the British Raj all-

perhaps directed) its officials and servants to keep in touch with the Congress. The intelligent leaders of public opinion soon took the winds out of the sails of the British Raj, and they made Congress the forum from which demands of the vast mass of Indian humanity could be echoed and re-echoed.

The British Raj began to feel uneasy in its shoes. When the hope of reclamation of the Congress was completely shattered, the Government prohibited its servants to participate in and attend the meetings of the Congress. A few years after this, attitude of the Government grew definitely hostile to the Congress, which was growing more and more popular, powerful and clamorous for the rights of Indians.

King George V, as Prince of Wales, made a tour of India in the winter of 1905-06 and returned to his country in the spring of 1906. Lord Morley, the then Secretary of State for India, wrote a letter to Lord Minto, the then Viceroy of India :—

"Yesterday I had a long conversation with the Prince of Wales in which he gave me an immensely interesting account of his impressions in India. His key word is that we should get on better if our administrators showed wider sympathy . . . He talked of the National Congress rapidly becoming a great power. My own impression, formed long ago and confirmed since I came to this office, is that it

will mainly depend upon ourselves whether the Congress is a power for good or evil. There it is whether we like it or not."¹

This letter is dated 11th May, 1906 To this Lord Minto replied on May 18th, 1906 :—

"As to the Congress... ..there is much that is absolutely disloyal in the movement and that there is danger for the future I have no doubt. You see extracts from the vernacular press the great bulk of the tone of it can only be termed disloyal... ..I have been thinking a good deal lately of a *possible counterpoise to Congress aims*. I think we may find a solution in the Council of Princes or in an elaboration of that idea, a Privy Council not only of native Rulers but of a few other big men to meet say once a year for a week or a fortnight at Delhi for instance. Subjects for discussion and procedure would have to be very carefully thought out, but *we should get different ideas from those of the Congress*, emanating from men already possessing great interest in the good Government of India... .. I cannot say how much I am with you as to 'sympathy' . . . But with all one's desire for sympathy one must not lose sight of hard facts. We are here a *small British Garrison*, surrounded by millions composed of factors of an inflammability unknown to the Western world,

1. "Morley's Recollections," Vol. II, Pp 170-71.

unsuited to Western form of government, and we must be physically strong or go to the wall."¹

In another letter dated 19th June 1906, Lord Morley wrote to Lord Minto :—

"Every body warns us that a new spirit is growing and spreading over India. Lawrence,² Chirol,³ Sydney Low,⁴ all sing the same song : 'You cannot go on governing in the same spirit ; you have got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles whatever you may think of them. Be sure that before long Muslims will throw in their lot with the Congressmen against you,' and so on and so forth. I do not know how true this may or may not be."⁵

Replying to this letter Lord Minto wrote on 27th June 1906, that he was fully alive to the "danger" and recognised Congress as a power with which he had to deal and with whose leaders he had to reckon.

With these letters as the background we proceed to see what happened on the Indian Stage.

On 1st October, 1906, a Mohammadan deputation headed by H. H. the Aga Khan was received in audience by H. E. the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and the Deputation

1. "Lady Minto's Diary," Pp. 28-29.

2. Sir Walter Lawrence, Private Secretary to Lord Curzon (Viceroy of India in 1896-1905).

3. Sir Valentine Chirol, correspondent, "The Times," London.

4. Sir Sydney Low, special correspondent, during the Royal Visit 1905-06.

5. "Lady Minto's Diary," P. 39.

presented an address to the effect that "the Mohammadan community should be represented as a community and the position of the Mohammadans be estimated not merely on their numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of the community and *services it rendered to the Empire.*"

Lord Minto's reply looked like the image of the Deputation's address, without even the well-known lateral inversion. Secretaries of State down to Sir Samuel Hoare, Lord Zetland and Mr. Amery have been only playing the gramophone record of Lord Minto's reply, whenever they opened their lips on the communal question of India.

Lord Minto said to this Deputation :—

"The pith of your address as I understand it, is a claim that under any system of representation, whether it affects a municipality or a district board or legislative council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the Mohammadan community should be represented as a community. You point out that in many cases, electoral bodies as now constituted cannot be expected to return a Mohammadan candidate and that if by chance that did so, it could only be at the sacrifice of such a candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his community, whom he would, in no way, represent and you *justly claim* that your position should be estimated not only on

your numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of your community, *and the services it has rendered to the Empire*. I am entirely in accord with you. Please do not misunderstand me. I make no attempt to indicate by what means representation of communities can be obtained, but I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be, that electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure, which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of this Continent. The great mass of the people of India have no knowledge of the representative institutions. In the meantime I can only say that the Mohammadan community may rest assured, that their political rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded by any administrative reorganisation with which I am concerned."

What was the nature and origin of this Mohammadan deputation and what was behind it? On this day, i.e. 1st October, 1906, the following occurs in the diary of H. E. Lady Minto "*A very eventful day, an epoch in Indian History.*"

That evening the Viceroy received the following letter from an official whose name and identity are not disclosed :—

"I must send your Excellency a line to say that a very big thing has happened today, a work of statesman-

ship that will affect India and Indian history for many a long year. It is nothing less than the *pulling back of 62 millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition.*"

That is not enough about this Deputation affair. Let us set the seal on it by a significant reproduction from Lady Minto's Diary, dated October 3, 1906 (i.e. only two days later). Writing on the death of a great friend and Muslim leader she writes: "*He it was who engineered the recent Mohammadan Deputation.*" The word "engineered" is interesting and meaningful.

Soon after, the Muslim League was formed at Aligarh on 30th December 1906. One of the chief aims of the Muslim League in its first constitution was "Loyalty to the British Government."

Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the late Prime Minister of England, in his book entitled *The Awakening in India* wrote that the immediate political successes that the Muslim League achieved in the matter of communal electorates and communal reservation of services confirmed the doubts that the Muslim leaders were instigated by the Anglo-Indian officials who were pulling wires from Simla and Whitehall. These officers sowed the seed of hatred and discord between the Hindus and Muslims by attempting to unduly favour one at the cost of the other.

From this time onward the Government began a policy of Muslim appeasement and pushed the Hindus to a great disadvantage. For instance, the Muslims were

given representation much above their numerical ratio. Their franchise was kept wider than that of the Hindus. A Muslim became enfranchised if he paid Rs. 750 as land revenue, but a Hindu had to pay Rs. 5,000 to get the same right. A Muslim had to pay Rs. 188 while a Hindu had to pay Rs. 1,250 as income-tax for getting the power to vote ! Every Mohammadan State pensioner and honorary magistrate had a vote by virtue of his status, but these qualifications were not enough for a Hindu to be enfranchised. The Mohammadan demands of the "engineered" Deputation of 1st October 1906 were practically accepted. The mischief was complete. A "counterpoise to Congress aims" was created, and "sixty-two millions of people were pulled back from joining the ranks of seditious opposition."

But perhaps the whole thing had been overdone. After an interview "with the sons of the crescent" as he called them, the Secretary of State, Lord Morley, wrote to the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, on January 28, 1909 :—

"How could I satisfy them by a straight declaration of my hat ? We have to take care that in picking up the Mussalmans we do not drop our Hindu parcels and this makes it impossible to blurt out the full length to which we are or may be ready to go in the Muslim direction."

We find a more brutal and frank cynicism in the letter dated 28th February 1909 from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy of India : -

tion It may be so. On the other hand, G. predicts that departure from the line we have agreed upon in our despatch would provoke at least as much reproach and dissatisfaction among the Hindus. We shall therefore have a stubborn talk in the Council, to which I shall not contribute more than two or three stubborn sentences. I am the least in the world of a Cromwellian, but I am beginning to understand, in a way never understood before, how impatience at the delays and cavilling and mistaking of very small points for big ones at last drove Oliver to send his councillors packing."¹

In another letter dated 28th August 1909, Lord Morley wrote to the Viceroy : "Morrison tells me that a Mohammadan is coming over here on purpose to see me and will appear on Monday next. Whatever happens I am quite sure that it was high time to put our foot definitely down and to let them know that the process of haggling has gone on long enough, come what may. I am only sorry we could not do it earlier."²

On December 6, 1909, the Secretary of State wrote to Lord Minto :

"I won't follow you again into our Mohammadan dispute. Only I respectfully remind you once more that it was your early speech about their extra claims that first started the M. hare. I am convinced my decision was best."

1. "Morley's Recollections" Vol. II, P. 315.

2. "Morley's Recollections" Vol. II, P. 317.